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ard supplemented by a "conscientiously held" standard or simply a "con-
scientiously held" standard, its introduction of this good faith element by 
either means is not inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII. As noted earlier, 
that purpose is the elimination of employment discrimination. 62 When there is 
no unlawful discrimination in fact, however, effectuation of the act's purpose is 
not aided by allowing the protection of section 704(a) to an employee who does 
not sincerely believe that the policy or practice in question is discriminatory 
even if a reasonable person in the employee's position would so believe. To 
provide protection through section 704 in these circumstances would be to 
allow the Act's remedial purpose to be subverted for personal motives and 
benefit. No end consonant with Title VII's purpose is served by allowing one 
who knows that the employer's practice is lawful to use the protection of section 
704(a) as a sword against compliance with the employer's legitimate demands 
or as a means of disrupting the employer's place of business. 
Despite this value as a prophylactic measure, however, the use of the sub-
jective approach, whether alone or in conjunction with the reasonable belief 
approach, has some drawbacks. Its primary disadvantage is that it requires a 
court to determine the employee's intent in engaging in the opposition. In ad-
dition, the subjective approach can lead to a situation where identical acts may 
be protected under section 704(a) in one case but unprotected in another. The 
primary benefit of the objective approach, on the other hand, is that it avoids 
this necessity of probing the employee's state of mind. Since the subjective test 
is used successfully in other contexts,63 however, these practical problems do 
not seem of sufficient magnitude to outweigh its benefits. Such an approach ex-
tends section 704 protection to the employee who sincerely but unreasonably 
believes his employer is unlawfully discriminating, minimizes misuse of Title 
VII for illicit personal benefit, and reduces the possibility of successful use of 
the Act for unfounded disruption of the employer's business. Because the sub-
jective approach offers these advantages, the First Circuit's approach in 
Monteiro is defensible and desirable. 
C. Seniority Systems: California Brewers Association v. Bryant* 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits practices, procedures, 
or tests that operate to" 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employ-
ment practices."2 Seniority systems, however, are exempted from this prohibi-
tion by section 703(h). This exemption permits an employer to use different 
standards of compensation and other employment benefits where such differ-
ences are based on a seniority or merit system.3 The exemption is not available 
where such differences arise out ofthe employer's intent to discriminate on ac-
62 See text at note 55 supra. 
63 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (defamation); St. Joseph 
Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51 (1975) (fraud). 
• By Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW. 
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). 
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). 
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count of race. 4 In International Brotherhood oj Teamsters v. United States,5 the 
Supreme Court of the United States interpreted this exception as intended to 
"make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would 
not be unlawful under Title VII ... even where the employer's pre-Act dis-
crimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights than 
Negroes."6 Title VII does not define "seniority system" nor is this term de-
fined by legislative history. 7 In the Survey year decision of California Brewers Asso-
ciation v. Bryant,8 however, the Supreme Court for the first time undertook to 
define "seniority system" as used in section 703(h). 
In Bryant the respondent challenged the purported "seniority system" 
contained in the multi-employer collective bargaining agreement between the 
California Brewers Association and the Teamsters. 9 This system operated by 
defining permanent, temporary, and new employees and by articulating the 
rights of each employee class regarding hiring and lay-offs. 1o Respondent 
claimed, inter alia, that the agreement's requirement that an employee work 
forty-five weeks in a calendar year in order to atquire permanent status barred 
him and the members of his putative class from achieving, or from having a 
reasonable opportunity to achieve, permanent status. 11 Therefore, respondent 
argued, the forty-five-week rule perpetuated historical racial discrimination. 12 
The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the 
complaint for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 13 
Although no opinion accompanied this order the court's decision probably 
rested on its conclusion that the rule was part of a bona fide seniority system. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision,14 ruling that the 
forty-five-week provision was not a seniority system nor was it a part of one 
within the meaning of Title VILI5 The court of appeals reasoned that to qualify 
as a seniority system, the forty-five-week rule would have to provide for an in-
4 /d. 
5 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
6 /d. at 352. 
7 See 110 CONGo REC. 1518, 5423, 7207, 7213, 7217, 12723 (1964). 
8 444 U.S. 598 (1980). 
9 /d. at 600-01. 
10 /d. at 602-03. Respondent had been employed intermittently by one of the peti-
tioners, the Falstaff Brewing Corporation, since 1968. Because he had not worked more than 45 
weeks in anyone calendar year, he had never qualified as a permanent employee under the terms 
of the multi-employer collective bargaining agreement between the California Brewers Associa-
tion (the petitioner brewing companies) and the Teamsters Brewery and Soft Drink Workers 
Joint Board of California (the defendant-employee unions). /d. at 601-02. 
II /d. at 602. . 
12 /d. at 601-02. Respondent brought this suit as a class action on behalf of himself and 
ether Negroes similarly situated against petitioner and several unions. He filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that defendants had 
discriminated against the putative class in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e and of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. /d. at 601. The complaint also asserted under 29 
U .S.C. §§ 159 & 185 that the defendant unions had breached their duty by, among other things, 
the negotiation of unreasonable privileges for some employees and not others. /d. at 601 n.3. The 
Supreme Court, however, considered only the Title VII claim. /d. 
13 This decision is unreported. See 444 U.S. at 601. 
H Bryant V. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978). 
15 Id. at 427. 
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crease in employment rights as the duration of employment increased. 16 The 
rule, however, did not achieve this end since employees would be terminated 
shortly before completing a forty-five-week period of employment. They subse-
quently would be rehired and the forty-five-week period would begin to run 
anew. Consequently, employees could work for great lengths of time while 
never satisfying the forty-five-week requirement. Thus the rule effectively 
barred many long term employees from attaining permanent work statusY 
The court, therefore, characterized the rule as "simply a classitication device 
to determine who enters the permanent employee seniority line" and it con-
cluded that "this function does not make the rule part of a seniority system." 18 
It remanded the case to the district court for trial to determine whether the 
forty-five-week standard had a discriminatory impact on blacks. 
The Supreme Court granted certioraril9 to determine the scope of the 
seniority system exception under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 
deciding whether the forty-five-week provision qualified as a seniority system, 
the Court found it necessary to define the term "seniority system" within the 
meaning of Title VII. To do so, it relied upon "commonly accepted notions 
about 'seniority' in industrial relations"20 and considered such concepts in 
light of Title VII and national labor policy. 21 It noted first that "seniority" 
connotes length of employment and that a "seniority system" conditions im-
proved employment rights and benefits upon increased lengths of employ-
ment. 22 Thus, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the essential ele-
ment of a seniority system is the enhancement of employment rights as a func-
tion of an increase in employment duration. 
Unlike the court of appeals, however, the Supreme Court held that senior-
ity systems could encompass provisions that would not in themselves provide 
for increased benefits based on the length of employment, 23 provided such rules 
were necessary to make the system as a whole function. 24 The Court character-
ized the forty-five-week requirement as such a rule. 
The Court supported its rather flexible delineation of Title VII's use of the 
term "seniority system" with a cursory examination of the nation's labor 
policy. It observed that the structure of a particular seniority system is the 
product of the collective bargaining process in a particular business or in-
dustry.25 As a result, it must be expected that the characteristics of seniority 
systems will vary depending on the parties to the agreement. 26 The Court con-
16 /d. at 426. 
17 /d. at 426-27. 
18 /d. at 427 n.ll. 
19 442 U.S. 916 (1979). 
20 444 U.S. at 605. 
21 [d. 
22 /d. at 605-06. 
23 /d. at 606-07. 
24 /d. at 607-08. For example, such rules could define the types of employment condi-
tions that would be affected by seniority and set out the circumstances under which seniority 
would be forfeited. 
25 [d. at 608. 
26 /d. 
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eluded that section 703(h) is not intended to prefer any particular type of 
seniority system over another. 27 
The Court tempered its malleable interpretation of a section 703(h) 
seniority system by stating that employment rules that "depart fundamentally 
from commonly accepted notions concerning the acceptable contours of a 
seniority system" cannot qualify for the section 703(h) exception merely by be-
ing labeled as part of a seniority system.28 It implied that section 703(h) only 
applies to those employment rules that clearly are based on length of employ-
ment and to those rules that, though not directly time-related, are necessary to 
make the seniority system work. 29 Thus, in the Court's view, a threshold re-
quirement for entering a seniority tract that has no direct or indirect relation to 
durational considerations cannot qualify for a section 703(h) exemption. 30 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the Court found that the 
agreement created two parallel seniority tracts, one for temporary employees 
and another for permanent employees.31 The Court characterized the forty-
five-week provision as defining the threshold qualification required to enter the 
permanent employee seniority track.32 Because this provision focused on length 
of employment, the Court found it to be a component of a seniority system 
within the meaning of section 703(h).33 Accordingly, the Court reversed the 
court of appeals and held that the forty-five-week rule was a part of a section 
703(h) seniority system.34 It noted, however, that on remand to the district 
court, respondent still could invalidate the rule if it could show either that the 
seniority system established by the agreement was not' 'bona fide," or that the 
differences in employment conditions attributable to the agreement were the 
product of international racial discrimination within the meaning of section 
703(h).35 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented, 
finding the majority's opinion inconsistent with the purposes and intent of sec-
tion 703(h).36 He agreed with the Court that a seniority system is " 'a scheme 
that, alone or in tandem with non-'seniority' criteria allots to employees ever 
imposing employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent 
employment increase.' "37 He maintained, however, that the forty-five-week 
rule was not a bona fide element of a permissible seniority system because it 




30 /d. at 608-09. The Court mentioned educational pre-requisites, physical or aptitude 
tests, and "subjective standards" as examples of threshold requirements that bear no direct or 
indirect relation to the duration of employment. /d. at 609-10. 
casc. 
3. /d. 
32 /d. at 609. 
33 /d. 
34 /d. at 610-11. 
35 Id. 
36 /d. Justice Powell and Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
37 Id. at 614 (quoting majority opinion at 605-06). 
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benefits as their length of service increased.38 Justice Marshall noted that 
because the industry was seasonal and because a temporary employee easily 
could be replaced by a permanent employee or otherwise layed-off, the forty-
five-week rule did not focus on time, but on circumstances beyond the 
employee's control. 39 Since the forty-five-week provision functioned in this 
manner, Justice Marshall found it at odds with common notions of seniority 
and, therefore, not a part of a section 703(h) seniority system.40 
Justice Marshall's opinion reflects a concern that the forty-five-week rule 
easily could be abused by employers desiring to keep minorities out of perma-
nent positions. Although it reached an opposite result, the Court, to some ex-
tent shared this concern. The majority observed that freedom of collective bar-
gaining must not be allowed to sweep within the ambit of section 703(h) em-
ployment rules that depart fundamentally from commonly accepted notions 
concerning the acceptable contours of a seniority system simply because those 
rules are dubbed "seniority" provisions or have some nexus to an arrange-
ment that concededly operates on the basis of seniority. 41 Competing with this 
concern, however, was the Court's determination to leave unfettered the free-
dom of employers and unions to design differing seniority systems through col-
lective bargaining. The Court correctly reconciled the need for this freedom 
with the dangers of abusing the 703(h) exemption by a loosely defining senior-
ity system. In doing so, it implicitly recognized that checks on such abuse are 
not to be imposed by limiting definitions but are to be found instead in section 
703(h)'s prescription of "seniority systems" which are not "bona fide" and 
which are the product of racial discrimination. In sum, the decision provided 
employers and unions with general guidelines for determining what may and 
may not be included in a section 703(h) seniority system, while maintaining 
freedom of collective bargaining to the fullest extent possible. 
The majority's opinion leaves open two avenues of attack on provisions 
that allegedly are not within the section 703(h) exemption. First, it may be 
argued that the rule or provision does not conform to commonly accepted no-
tions of seniority berause it does not focus on the enhancement of employee 
privileges conditioned by the length of employment because it gives effect to 
subjective qualifications. 42 It was this argument that was advanced by respon-
dent in Bryant, but it failed since the Court found that the challenged pro\·isions 
did condition employment benefits on the length of employment. The Court 
expressly noted, however, that a second line of argument remained available to 
respondent on remand. 43 Thus, if a rule is found to constitute a seniority prO\-i-
sion, it may be asserted that the rule does not comply with the section 703(h) 
requirement that the seniority system be bona fide and without racial intent to 
qualify for the exemption. 
38 !d. at 615. 
39 !d. 
40 [d. at 615-16. 
41 [d. at 609. 
42 The majority and the dissenters agree that educational and physical standards or tcsts 
are "subjective" criteria while the length of employmcnt is "objccti\·c." /d. at 609, 618. 
43 !d. at 610-11. 
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Consequently, Justice Marshall's concern that the forty-five-week rule 
was an abuse of the exemption might be alleviated by respondent's showing 
that even though the rule is a component of a seniority system, it nevertheless is 
employed to perpetuate intentional racial discrimination. Such a showing 
would preclude the characterization of the seniority system as "bona fide" 
within the meaning of section 703(h) and bar the availability of the exemption. 
Because respondent in Bryant had not advanced this argument, there was no 
finding before the Court as to whether the termination of temporary employees 
shortly before the completion of a forty-five-week period was the product of in-
tentional racial discrimination or the result of a seasonal demand for labor in 
the California brewing industry. 
The adequacy of the Court's delineation of the scope of the seniority 
system exemption can be determined only by more litigation. Through the in-
terpretation and application of the holding in Bryant, it will become evident 
whether the Court's safeguards are sufficient to prevent Justice Marshall's con-
cerns from becoming a reality. 
III. DISCRIMINATION IN SKILLED AND UNSKILLED POSITIONS 
A. Qualificationsfor Unskilled Labor: Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co. '" 
In a Title VIP action, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination. This may be done, in part, by 
showing that the plaintiff was qualified for the position sought. 2 It is clear that 
when an employer seeks applicants for a skilled position for which there are 
minimum objective qualifications, the plaintiff must show that she has met 
these standards. When the employer, however, seeks applicants for an un-
skilled position for which there are no articulated requirements, the question 
arises whether a plaintiff must show he is qualified for an unskilled job in order 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in accordance with the stand-
ard of proof enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green. 3 The standards laid down by the Court in McDonnell Douglas places the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination with the com-
plainant. 4 Once this step has been completed the burden shifts to the employer 
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.s Lastly, 
once the defendant-employer has convinced the court of the legitimacy of its 
* By Audrey Helen Rothschild, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW. 
I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1976). 
2 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Supreme Court 
described the initial burden of proof which a plaintiff must meet in an employment discrimina-
tion case. The complainant in a Title VII suit must carry the initial burden of proof by establish-
ing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that the plaintiff 
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the em-
ployer was seeking applicants; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected for the job; and 
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 
3 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973). 
• Id. 
5 /d. 
